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THE EVOLUTION OF COVERAGE UNDER
THE MILLER ACT
MATTHEW V. BYRNE, JR.*
JOHN J. COSTELLO*
RECENT years have witnessed an ever increasing number of public
improvement projects undertaken by the Federal Government. The
contracts for these improvements aggregate in the billions of dollars
yearly.1 Such enormous expenditures naturally stimulate the economy
and produce a heavy concentrated market for supplies of building
materials and construction equipment. Inherent, however, in projects
of this nature are the dangers to which materialmen and suppliers are
subject when they extend credit to the contractor or his subcontractors.
A contractor who is careless or neglects to include all the costs and an
adequate profit in his bid price soon becomes a menace to his suppliers
and may find himself faced with bankruptcy. He may be harrassed by
unforeseeable difficulties; labor problems, increased costs, or unexpected
ground conditions can place him in a tenuous financial position with
consequent hazards to his suppliers. If the improvement were made
upon private property, the supplier could, in the event of nonpayment,
claim a lien against the real property to the extent of the value of the
materials delivered and incorporated into the work. However, policy
and common sense prohibit such security upon a public project. Instead,
the supplier may be granted a lien upon the funds due from the public
authority for payment of the improvement,2 or, as in the federal sphere,
he may be granted a direct right of action upon the payment bond
required to be posted by the contractor. The "Miller Act"' requires the
contractor on any federal project exceeding $2,000 in amount to supply
a payment bond "for the protection of all persons supplying all labor
and materials in the prosecution of the work provided for in said con-
tract." Section 2 of the Act confers upon a laborer or materialman the
right to sue the surety upon the payment bond where he has not been
paid for a period of 90 days from the date when the last of the materials
or services were supplied.5 The benefit of the Act extends not only to
* Members of the New York Bar.
1. The U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the total
value of contracts awarded for Federal construction in the calendar year 1958 was $2,959,-
400,000; the iralue of such contracts in New York for that period was $119,200,000.
2. See, e.g., N.Y. Lien Law § 5.
3. 49 Stat. 793-94 (1935), 40 U.S.C. §§ 270(a),(b) (1952).
4. 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) (1952).
5. 49 Stat. 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270(b) (1952).
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suppliers of the contractor but also to suppliers of a subcontractor,
provided certain statutory conditions are met.'
The terms of the standard bond issued pursuant to the Act incorporate
verbatim the statutory language relating to coverage:
If the principal shall promptly make payment to all persons supplying labor and
material in the prosecution of the work provided for in said contract . . . then
this obligation to be void; otherwise to remain in full force and virtue.7
Thus, since "the surety's liability under the Miller Act must be at least
co-extensive with the obligation imposed by the Act, if the bond is to have
its intended effect," the supplier's "rights against the surety depend upon,
and are to be measured by, the applicable provisions of § 2 (a) of the
Act."8
While it has long been established that the Act should be liberally
construed in favor of the materialman, 9 coverage nevertheless has been
the subject of a rather slow and tedious development. That development
can be understood only by examining the law as it preceded the Miller
Act.
BACKGROUND
Prior to 1935 when the Miller Act was passed, the applicable statute
was the "Heard Act"'" which granted to a supplier of a contractor on
a federal improvement a right of action for labor or materials used
in the construction; the right of action arose six months after the date
of final settlement of the contract. The Heard Act was designed to
afford protection to the supplier in the absence of his normal recourse
to a lien upon the improvement itself. Thus, coverage was predicated
upon analogy to mechanic's lien statutes," and became coextensive with
the extent to which the value of the material furnished added to the value
of the completed improvement.' 2 Coverage therefore unquestionably ex-
tended to building materials and supplies which were designed for and
6. Written notice must be given to the prime contractor within 90 days after the delivery
of the last of the materials. 49 Stat. 794(2) (a) (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270(b) (a) (1952).
7. U.S. Standard Form No. 25-A, 41 U.S.C. App. § 54.16 (1952).
8. United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210, 216 (1957).
9. United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, supra note 8; Brogan v. National Sur. Co.,
246 U.S. 257 (1918) ; United States ex rel. Hill v. American Sur. Co., 200 U.S. 197 (1906) ;
Glassell-Taylor Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 153 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1946); United
States ex rel. Purity Paint Prods. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 56 F. Supp. 431 (D. Conn.
1944).
10. Ch. 280, 28 Stat. 278 (1894), as amended, ch. 778, 33 Stat. 811 (1905), as amended,
ch. 231, § 291, 36 Stat. 1167 (1911), repealed by ch. 642, § 5, 49 Stat. 793-94 (1935).
11. Illinois Sur. Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U.S. 376, 380 (1917). Cf. American Sur.
Co. v. Lawrenceville Cement Co., 110 Fed. 717 (D. Me. 1901).
12. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Ohio River Gravel Co., 20 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1927).
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which were in fact incorporated into the completed project. Coverage also
reached certain items which, while not directly incorporated into the
work, indirectly contributed to the accomplishment of the finished prod-
uct.13 Under this general test, certain cases concluded that coverage
should be based upon consumption of the item upon the bonded project. 4
Thus, in United States v. Ambursen Dam Co.,15 the court, being con-
cerned with coverage of tires supplied for the contractor's vehicles, re-
marked that "the theory of construction followed in the more recent and
best-considered cases is that the statute was intended to cover all things
which contributed to the enterprise whether directly by going physically
into the construction or indirectly by being entirely used and consumed
in the construction."'0 The court also noted that upon the proof of con-
sumption it was appropriate to consider the time when the tires were
purchased and began to be used, the character of the terrain and the
roads upon which the tires were to be used, the weight loads of the
vehicles upon which the tires were mounted, etc.'7
Therefore, whether the item supplied was a building material designed
for incorporation into the work or a tool or appliance designed for use as
part of the contractor's equipment upon the project, the coverage of
such items was determinable at the termination of the job and was based
upon objective proof of their use and exhaustion in the course of the
bonded improvement. No distinction apparently was made or intended
as to the type of equipment supplied-whether it was a capital item or a
mere appliance or accessory.
Another view, however, emphasized the "inherent character" of the
items supplied, rather than the length of time for which or the manner
in which they happen to be used. In National Sur. Co. v. United States
ex rel. Pittsburgh & Buffalo Co.,'" the circuit court, in discussing coverage
of rope, wire cable and chains, stated: "Things of this class are not
normally intended for specific use and exhaustion upon the work where
they are first sent. They are facilities for doing that work and any other
work to which they may be applied."' 9 While this concept subsequently
13. Brogan v. National Sur. Co., supra note 9, at 261 stated: "This court has repeatedly
refused to limit the application of the act to labor and materials directly incorporated
into the public work."
14. United States v. Charles H. Tompkins Co., 72 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (lumber for
construction of concrete forms); United States ex rel. Galliher & Huguely, Inc. v. James
Baird Co., 73 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (decking and timbers).
15. 3 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Cal. 1933).
16. Id. at 553. (Emphasis added.)
17. Id. at 552.
18. 228 Fed. 577 (6th Cir. 1916), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Brogan v. National
Sur. Co., 246 U.S. 257 (1918).
19. Id. at 586.
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received some judicial recognition, ° it seems to have been rejected by
the Supreme Court in the National Surety case. There the Court stated:
The Circuit Court of Appeals deemed immaterial the special circumstances under
which the supplies were furnished and the findings of fact by the trial court that
they were necessary to and wholly consumed in the prosecution of the work provided
for in the contract and bond. In our opinion these facts are not only material, but
decisive. They establish the conditions essential to liability on the bond.21
Thus, under the Heard Act, the supplier's rights were considerably
circumscribed-his right of action did not arise until six months after
final settlement of the contract and, as a condition precedent to recovery,
he was obliged to prove that the materials supplied (and over which he
had relinquished all surveillance and control) were used and consumed
upon the bonded project. While bond protection was, therefore, extended
by the statute, its scope was not determinable by the supplier upon
delivery of his materials. Coverage remained undecided until the
materials were used and used to an extent whereby it could be concluded
that they were consumed upon the job.
THE MILLER ACT
The Miller Act was apparently designed to dispense with proof of
consumption as a test of coverage. The Act granted a supplier a right
of action ninety days after the last of the materials had been delivered.2
It is plain, therefore, that the Act did not contemplate a criterion for bond
protection which, running the length of the job, could conceivably exceed
the ninety day period by many months or even a year. This conclusion
is fortified by the fact that the statute deleted the word "used" as it had
appeared in the Heard Act and instead granted protection simply to
those supplying all the labor and materials in the prosecution of the
work.2 3 What, then, was to be the test of coverage?
In United States ex rel. Purity Paint Prod. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co.,24 the problem received close consideration. The plaintiff had
supplied paint to a subcontractor on the bonded job, but it had been
rejected and returned. In an action upon the contractor's bond, the surety
contended that proof of incorporation or consumption was a condition
precedent to recovery. The court rejected this argument, showing by
an examination of the statute that such alleged proof was inconsistent
with its provisions. While declining to define the limits of coverage, the
20. United States ex rel. Baltimore Cooperage Co. v. McCay, 28 F.2d 777, 780 (D. Md.
1928).
21. Brogan v. National Sur. Co., supra note 9, at 262.
22. 49 Stat. 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270(b) (1952).
23. 49 Stat. 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270(b) (1952).
24. 56 F. Supp. 431 (D. Conn. 1944).
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court held, in effect, that upon delivery of the paint to the subcontractor
the protection of the bond attached. Subsequent cases dealing with
building materials have almost uniformly used delivery as a criterion
for coverage?5 However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, while
granting a recovery for building materials supplied but not used,2 6 gave
particular emphasis to the fact that the materials became a part of the
contractor's inventory replacing similar materials which had been with-
drawn from inventory and installed in the project. One wonders whether
the same result would have been reached if there had not been a con-
structive installation of the materials in the project. The Tenth Circuit
has elsewhere indicated that where suppliers of tools and equipment seek
the protection of the bond, consumption is still the test. Thus, in
Continental Cas. Co. v. Clarence L. Boyd Co.,27 the court held that repair
parts for vehicles were within the bond only if there was proof that they
were necessary to and wholly consumed in the performance of the work;
as authority for this interpretation of the Miller Act, the court cited
several cases28 decided under the Heard Act. The court reiterated the
principle, prevalent under the Heard Act, that the payment bond did not
cover items of equipment and replacement parts which added materially
to the contractor's equipment and rendered it available for other work.
The recent decision of the Tenth Circuit in St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co.
v. United States ex rel. Jones9 indicates that the view enunciated in the
Continental Cas. case still persists.
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, declined, shortly after passage of
the Miller Act, to apply the same meaning as that given to the earlier
statute. In Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co. v. United States,30 nu-
merous automotive parts, including new motors, had been supplied to
a contractor on a levee project. The issue as framed by the court was
whether the parts constituted capital replacements or whether they were
in the nature of current repairs and maintenance. To resolve the issue,
25. United States ex rel. Color Craft Corp. v. Dickstein, 157 F. Supp. 126 (E.D.N.C.
1957) (paint); United States ex rel. J. A. Edwards & Co., v. Bregman Constr. Corp., 156
F. Supp. 784 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) (electrical supplies); Montgomery v. Unity Elec. Co., 155
F. Supp. 179 (D.P.R. 1957). Cf. United States ex rel. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v.
Robbins, 125 F. Supp. 25 (D. Mass. 1954) (electrical supplies).
26. Fourt v. United States ex rel. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 235 F.2d 433 (10th
Cir. 1956), affirming 131 F. Supp. 584 (W.D. Okla. 1955); Commercial Standard Ins. Co.
v. United States ex rel. Crane Co., 213 F.2d 106 (10th Cir. 1954).
27. 140 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1944).
28. Brogan v. National Sur. Co., supra note 9; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Ohio River Gravel
Co., supra note 12; United States ex rel. Galliher & Huguely, Inc. v. James Baird Co., supra
note 14.
29. 238 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1956).
30. 88 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1937).
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the court looked to the nature of the work being prosecuted. It noted
that the conditions on the job were extraordinary and that truck parts
which might last several years under normal conditions rapidly wore out.
Under these circumstances, it concluded that the materials were "con-
sumable" and, therefore, within the coverage of the bond. The test
applied was based upon the expected life of the materials on the date of
delivery, not upon their actual use and consumption on the job. If the
items were consumable in the normal course of the bonded project, they
were covered by the bond; if, on the other hand, they would normally
survive the job to be used elsewhere by the contractor, they were capital
items for which the Act provided no right of recovery.
In a subsequent case,3 the Fifth Circuit elaborated further on its
concept of coverage under the Miller Act. The materials for which
recovery was sought were gasoline and oil. On appeal from a judgment
in favor of the supplier, the defendants contended that sale and delivery
had not been proved, and that, even if proved, much of the material was
not used in the work and a considerable portion thereof never reached
the job site. The court stated:
There is no provision in the statute [the Miller Act] requiring that materialmen must
deliver the materials at the job site or that the materials "be used" in the prosecution
of the work. The statute only requires that the materials be furnished in the prosecu-
tion of the work .... Whether or not the materials were wholly consumed "in the
prosecution of" the work provided for in the contract and bond is not controlling.
What is important is the fact that these materials were "supplied" to the sub-
contractor in the prosecution of the work provided for.32
The court also granted judgment for gasoline which had been diverted
to private use, holding that it would be "manifestly unjust" to deny a
recovery merely because some of the material beyond the plaintiff's
disposition and control had been used elsewhere than on the bonded
project.
More recently, the Second Circuit has further crystallized the matter
of coverage under the Act with respect to items of equipment. In United
States ex rel. J. P. Byrne & Co. v. Fire Ass'n,33 the defendant's principal
was a prime contractor on the St. Lawrence Seaway project. The use-
plaintiff supplied the contractor with materials and services consisting
primarily of new tires and tubes for its large earth-moving vehicles and
the recapping of these tires. Upon the contractor's default in payment,
the use-plaintiff sued the surety upon the bond. Both the district court
and the court of appeals found that the working conditions at the ex-
cavation site were unusual. The earth moving equipment was being
31. Glassell-Taylor Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 153 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1946).
32. Id. at 529.
33. 260 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1958).
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operated at an average of over 100 hours per week; the temperature
ranged from 100 to 250 below zero. 34 The vehicles had to negotiate a
steep incline from the excavation area to the dumping area. The repair
and replacement of tires was admittedly a constantly recurring item, and
the estimate of average life of the tires ranged from 300 hours (by plain-
tiff's expert) to 1800 hours (by defendant's experts). 5 The court of
appeals, in modifying36 and affirming the judgment of the district court
in favor of the use-plaintiff, based its decision upon the degree of "ex-
pected consumption of the items on the particular job for which they
were furnished." 37 The court stated:
At the time of their delivery, the facts unequivocally show that both the use plain-
tiff and the construction company reasonably expected them [i.e., the tires] to have
been substantially used up in the work under the contract. Although many of these
items may not in fact have been consumed prior to the unexpected work stoppage,
there is not the slightest taint in this case of an attempt by the contractor, within
the constructive knowledge of its suppliers, to build up its permanent capital invest-
ment at the Surety's expense.38
Several factors which have been previously discussed obviously influ-
enced the court's decision in this case:
1. The deletion of the word "used," as contained in the Heard Act,
and the insertion of the word "furnished" in the Miller Act;
2. The obvious conflict between the requirement of actual consump-
tion and the statutory grant of an immediate right of action 90 days
after delivery of the materials;
3. The impossible burden which would be cast upon the supplier if
he were obliged to prove consumption of materials over which he
had relinquished all control;
4. The frustration of the protective purpose of the Act if the material-
man could not predict coverage of his materials at the time of
delivery.
The court also took cognizance of certain abuses apprehended by
the defendant surety as a probable consequence of the decision of the
district court. It was urged: (1) that the contractor could wait until
the termination of the job and then refurbish his equipment at the ex-
pense of the surety; (2) that the contractor could fraudulently or in-
nocently divert the materials from the bonded work to another project.39
34. Id. at 543.
35. Id. at 543.
36. The appellate court reduced the judgment by $276.46, representing the cost of
certain highway truck tires concerning which no proof of expected consumption had been
introduced. Id. at 545.
37. 260 F.2d at 544.
38. Id. at 544.
39. Id. at 545.
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In either event, the court held, recovery should not be denied under the
Act unless the supplier had constructive knowledge of the contractor's
intentions.
40
The degree to which the court in the J. P. Byrne case applied its doc-
trine of "expected consumption" is especially apparent from the fact
that the tires and tubes were delivered between February 27 and April
7, 1956. The job terminated on April 11, 1956 by joint action of the
government and the contractor. The great majority of tires and recapped
tires could not therefore have been consumed upon the job even if their
anticipated life was only 300 hours, as contended by the use-plaintiff.
Of course, if the job had been completed on April 11th, rather than being
unexpectedly terminated, it could not have been said that the parties
at the time of delivery anticipated that the materials would be substan-
tially consumed in the work under the contract.
CONCLUSIONS
It is apparent from the weight of authority that delivery of materials
at the job site is not a prerequisite to coverage under the Miller Act,
nor does innocent or fraudulent diversion of materials from the bonded
project by the contractor affect coverage so long as the supplier has no
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the contractor's intent.
As to items normally intended for incorporation into the completed
project, coverage arises upon delivery irrespective of whether the items
are subsequently used or incorporated. As to items constituting part of
the contractor's equipment, coverage arises upon delivery provided it may
then be reasonably expected that they will be substantially used up in the
course of the bonded job. Whether an item comes within the bond does
not necessarily depend upon its inherent character but rather upon its
anticipated use on the project.
The question of coverage is therefore regulated by the doctrine of
"expected consumption" rather than "actual consumption." Items which,
under normal circumstances, might be deemed capital equipment because
of their durability and the likelihood that they would survive the bonded
job might, nevertheless, be subject to coverage where the work was
prosecuted under extraordinary conditions whereby it could reasonably
be anticipated that the equipment could not survive the job.
40. Id. at 545.
